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MEDIATED MAYHEM: MEDIA, CRIME, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
 
 
INTRODUCTION: COPS, CROOKS AND CULTURE – THE REACH OF MEDIATED 
IMAGES  
 
 
A key feature of contemporary societies is the omnipresence of mass media of 
communication, in rapidly proliferating new forms. A significant part of each day is 
devoted by most people to media consumption of various kinds. In 2010 on average 
people watched 4.03 hours of television daily (BARB: Trends in Television Viewing 
2010 February 2011).  
 
There is much controversy about the significance and effects of this media 
ĐoŶsuŵptioŶ, iŶ paƌtiĐulaƌ foƌ Đƌiŵe aŶd ĐƌiŵiŶal justiĐe ;see Chap.ϰ oŶ ͚Cultuƌal 
CƌiŵiŶologǇ͛ aŶd Chap. ϭϬ aďout puďliĐ ǀieǁs oŶ Đƌiŵe aŶd justiĐeͿ. The salieŶĐe of 
the media as perceived by people themselves is huge. A 2002 survey of Londoners 
fouŶd foƌ eǆaŵple that theiƌ ͚kŶoǁledge͛ of the poliĐe ǁas oǀeƌǁhelŵiŶglǇ dƌaǁŶ 
from the media: 
 
Figure 1: 
Sources of Information About the Police (%) 
 
 
(Fitzgerald et al 2002 Figure 6.1, p.78). 
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Thus 80% of those interviewed said their main source of information about policing 
was the news media (four times as many as cite direct experience). Perhaps even 
ŵoƌe suƌpƌisiŶg is that Ϯϵ% saǁ ͚ŵedia fiĐtioŶ͛ as a ĐƌuĐial souƌĐe – 9% more than 
͚diƌeĐt eǆpeƌieŶĐe͛. It is fasĐiŶatiŶg to poŶdeƌ ǁhetheƌ this is ŵaiŶlǇ the ŵoƌe 
͚ƌealistiĐ͛ fiĐtioŶal ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶs, suĐh as The Bill (described by former Met 
Commissioner Ian Blair as a permanent NVQ on policing) or The Wire, or Midsomer 
Murders, the rural idyll shatteƌed ďǇ ŵoƌe killiŶgs thaŶ Al CapoŶe͛s ChiĐago ;aŶd 
where it was a deliberate choice to exclude ethnic minority characters – ͚Midsoŵeƌ 
Muƌdeƌs pƌoduĐeƌ suspeŶded oǀeƌ diǀeƌsitǇ ƌeŵaƌks͛ The Guardian 15 March 2011).  
 
The ubiquity and the widely perceived influence of media representations of crime 
and criminal justice have stimulated various concerns about mass media 
representations of crime, deviance and disorder that have accompanied their 
development. It has long been feared, in particular by more conservative opinion, 
that the media are a significant cause of offending, and are fundamentally 
suďǀeƌsiǀe. This has ďeeŶ a peƌeŶŶiallǇ ƌeĐuƌƌiŶg aspeĐt of the ͚histoƌǇ of ƌespeĐtaďle 
feaƌs͛ that GeoffƌeǇ PeaƌsoŶ has tƌaĐed ďaĐk thƌough the last feǁ ĐeŶturies (Pearson 
1983). 
 
A contrasting concern about media representations of crime has worried liberals and 
radicals (Wykes 2001). To them the media are the cause not of crime itself but of 
exaggerated public alarm about law and order, generating support for repressive 
solutions (Gerbner 1970, 1995). In their ideal-typical form these perspectives are 
polar opposites, sharing in common only their demonization of the media. Each has 
generated huge research industries conducting empirical studies of media content, 
production, and effects (for critical analytic reviews see Brown 2003; Carrabine 2008; 
Marsh 2008; Greer 2009; Jewkes 2010). 
 
The difficulties in rigorously establishing straightforward causal relationships 
between images and effects have evoked the canard that media researchers are 
blinkered by libertarian prejudices. For example, Melanie Phillips has claimed that 
͚foƌ Ǉeaƌs, ŵedia aĐadeŵiĐs haǀe pooh-poohed any link between violence on screen 
aŶd iŶ ƌeal life͛, ďeĐause ͚ŵedia iŵages . . . merely provide ͞ĐheǁiŶg guŵ foƌ the 
eǇes͟ ͛;Phillips ϭϵϵϲͿ. This is a ĐaƌiĐatuƌe of the ŵedia ƌeseaƌĐh oŶ effeĐts. A ŵoƌe 
sophistiĐated ĐƌitiĐisŵ of the effeĐts ƌeseaƌĐh is that ͚ƌepeated failuƌes to fiŶd 
anything much out would . . . suggest that the wrong question was ďeiŶg asked͛ 
(Brown 2003: 28). But the pervasiveness and prominence of media in contemporary 
life ŵeaŶ that ͚the effeĐts deďate ƌefuses to go aǁaǇ͛ ;iďid.Ϳ. 
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The purpose of this chapter is to offer an analytic overview of the extensive 
empirical research and theoretical debates about how media represent crime and 
criminal justice. What patterns and trends are there in these representations, what is 
their impact, and how are they shaped and developed? In short, it will examine the 
content, consequences and causes of media representations of crime and criminal 
justice, and how these have changed and are changing. 
 
In previous editions of The Oxford Handbook of Criminology a long chapter described 
in some detail the findings of the huge volume of empirical research, mainly within a 
positivist paradigm, on the content and consequences of media representations. This 
will only be briefly summarised here, partly because of the severe methodological 
and theoretical limitations of such research (the more detailed account found in 
earlier volumes will still be available on the website). Instead the focus here will be 
on theoretical analyses of media production and impact, and the dramatically 
changing character of these in contemporary culture.  
 
The next section will provide a brief summary and critique of the empirical research 
on content, consequences and causes of media representations of crime and justice. 
The second part will then give an overview of the theoretical debates about media, 
crime, criminalisation and control. The final section offers an analysis of the 
heightened significance of media representations of criminality and deviance in 
contemporary political-economic and cultural conditions.  
 
 
PART II: THE CONTENT AND CONSEQUENCES OF MEDIA REPRESENTATIONS OF 
CRIME: A BRIEF REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
 
 
Content analysis: some methodological health warnings 
 
͚CoŶteŶt aŶalǇsis͛ usuallǇ ƌefeƌs to a speĐifiĐ ŵethodology for analysing the content 
of media, deploying quantitative techniques within a positivist theoretical paradigm. 
As defiŶed ďǇ oŶe leadiŶg pƌaĐtitioŶeƌ, ͚ĐoŶteŶt aŶalǇsis is a ŵethod of studǇiŶg aŶd 
analyzing communications in a systematic, objective, and quantitative manner for 
the purpose of measuring certain message variables, . . . free of the subjective bias of 
the ƌeǀieǁeƌ͛ ;DoŵiŶiĐk ϭϵϳϴ: ϭϬϲ–7).  
 
Theƌe aƌe ŵajoƌ pƌoďleŵs ǁith the Đlaiŵ that ĐoŶteŶt aŶalǇsis is ͚oďjeĐtiǀe͛. While 
the Đategoƌies used to ƋuaŶtifǇ ͚ĐeƌtaiŶ ŵessage attƌiďutes͛ ŵaǇ ďe fƌee of 
͚suďjeĐtiǀe ďias͛ theǇ aƌe Ŷot ƌaŶdoŵlǇ pluĐked out of thiŶ aiƌ, aŶd ĐaŶŶot 
miraculously reflect a structure of meaning objectively inherent in the texts. They 
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necessarily embody theoretical presuppositions by the researcher about criteria of 
significance. Moreover, the categories selected for quantification usually presuppose 
some theory about likelǇ ĐoŶseƋueŶĐes. MetiĐulouslǇ ĐouŶtiŶg uŶits of ͚ǀioleŶĐe͛ is 
not a form of train-spotting for sadists but motivated by concern that exposure to 
these images carries risks such as desensitization, or heightened anxiety (Sparks 
1992: 79–80). 
 
There is a further fundamental problem with traditional content analyses. What the 
ƌeseaƌĐheƌ Đodifies as iŶstaŶĐes of the ͚saŵe͛ iŵage ŵaǇ haǀe ǀeƌǇ diffeƌeŶt 
meanings within particular narratives and contexts of reception. How viewers 
iŶteƌpƌet iŵages of ͚ǀioleŶĐe͛, for example, is not just a function of the amount of 
blood seen or number of screams heard. The same physical behaviour, for instance a 
shooting, means different things in different genres, say a Western, a war film, a 
contemporary cop show, or news bulletins. It will be interpreted differently if the 
violence is perpetrated on or by a character constructed in the narrative as 
sympathetic. How audiences construe violence will vary according to how they see 
their own position vis-à-vis the narrative characters, quite apart from any preferred 
reading intended by the creators or supposedly inscribed in the narrative. For 
example, to black audiences, Rodney King, whose beating by Los Angeles police 
officers was captured on an amateur videotape, was a victim of police racism, while 
to many white police officers he appeared to be a threatening deviant who invited 
the beating (Lawrence 2000: 70–3). 
 
These problems do not mean that quantification can or should be avoided, but they 
refute the claims of positivist content analysis to quantify a supposed objective 
structure in texts. Counting features of texts should be self-consciously seen as 
ďased oŶ the oďseƌǀeƌ͛s fƌaŵe of ƌefeƌeŶĐe, aĐĐoƌdiŶg to eǆpliĐit Đƌiteƌia. ‘esults 
must be interpreted reflexively and tentatively as one possible reading. As such, they 
can yield valuable insights and questions about the significance of trends and 
patterns.  
 
Content analysis: a roundup of results 
 
Criŵe ͚faĐt͛, Đriŵe ͚fiĐtioŶ͛: ďlurriŶg the ďouŶdaries 
 
Crime and criminal justice have long been sources of popular spectacle and 
entertainment, even before the rise of the mass media. This is illustrated by the 
genre of criminal biography and pre-execution confessions and apologias, of various 
degrees of authenticity, which flourished in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries (Faller 1987; Rawlings 1992; Durston 1997). Similar accounts continue to 
the pƌeseŶt daǇ, filliŶg the ͚tƌue Đƌiŵe͛ shelǀes of ďookshops ;‘aǁliŶgs ϭϵϵϴ; PeaǇ 
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1998; Wilson 2000: ch. 4; Biressi 2001), and they have been joined by the many 
volumes retelling the exploits of legendary cops as if they were fictional sleuths (e.g. 
Fabian 1950, 1954). In overtly fictional crime narratives, ultra-realism (often a quasi-
documentary style of presentation) has been the predominant style (Potter and 
Marshall 2010; Brunsdon 2010). 
 
The fact/fiction distinction has become ever more fluid, with the emergence of what 
is usuallǇ ƌefeƌƌed to as ͚ƌealitǇ͛ teleǀisioŶ oƌ ͚iŶfotaiŶŵeŶt͛ ;FishŵaŶ aŶd CaǀeŶdeƌ 
1998; Leishman and Mason 2002: ch. 7). There has been the growth of programming 
such as Crimewatch UK that re-creates current cases, often with an avowed purpose 
of solving them (Jewkes 2010: ch.6). Fly-on-the-wall footage of actual incidents has 
proliferated in documentaries like Roger Gƌaef͛s pioŶeeƌiŶg ϭϵϴϮ Thaŵes ValleǇ 
Police series, and entertainment programming based on real cops in action, for 
example Cops (Doyle 2003). Live newscasts of particular occurrences are increasingly 
common, such as the O. J. Simpson car chase and subsequent trial (Brown 2003: 56–
60). Film footage of criminal events in process is frequently used in news broadcasts, 
perhaps most influentially in the CCTV shots of Jamie Bulger being led away by his 
killers (Green 2008). Police deviance has been caught increasiŶglǇ ofteŶ oŶ ĐitizeŶs͛ 
cameras since the amateur video capturing the 1991 beating by Los Angeles police of 
Rodney King. The video footage that showed newspaper seller Ian Tomlinson had 
been struck and pushed to the ground by a police officer shortly before he died 
during the 2009 London G20 demonstration is a recent dramatic example, leading to 
a ĐoƌoŶeƌ͛s ǀeƌdiĐt of uŶlaǁful killiŶg ;Gƌeeƌ aŶd MĐlaughliŶ ϮϬϭϭͿ. “uĐh ĐhalleŶgiŶg 
of offiĐial aĐĐouŶts ďǇ the pƌolifeƌatioŶ of ĐitizeŶ ŵedia, duďďed ͚sǇŶoptiĐoŶ͛ 
;MathieseŶ ϭϵϵϳͿ oƌ ͚sousǀeillaŶĐe͛ ;MaŶŶ et al ϮϬϬϯͿ is a hugelǇ sigŶifiĐaŶt faĐtoƌ 
making contemporary media representations more complex and multi-faceted 
(Greer 2009 Part 6). The police for their part have increasingly resorted to the media 
as a part of criminal investigations (Innes 1999, 2003), as well as to cultivate support 
more generally (Mawby 1999, 2002, 2003, 2010a). The media and criminal justice 
systems are penetrating each other increasingly, making a firm distinction between 
͚faĐtual͛ aŶd ͚fiĐtioŶal͛ pƌogƌaŵŵiŶg teŶuous ;MaŶŶiŶg ϭϵϵϴͿ. The iŵpliĐatioŶs ǁill 
be explored further in the conclusions, but we will turn next to a consideration of the 
results of content analyses. 
 
Deviant news: Extent 
 
Crime narratives and representations are, and have always been, a prominent part of 
the content of all mass media. The proportion of media content that is constituted 
ďǇ Đƌiŵe iteŵs ĐleaƌlǇ ǁill depeŶd oŶ the defiŶitioŶs of ͚Đƌiŵe͛ used.  
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Richard Ericson and his colleagues adopted an exceptionally broad definition of 
deviance for their study of newsmaking in Toronto (Ericson et al. 1987, 1989, 1991): 
͚the ďehaǀiouƌ of a thiŶg oƌ peƌsoŶ that stƌaǇs fƌoŵ the Ŷoƌŵal . . . not 
only . . . ĐƌiŵiŶal aĐts͛ ;EƌiĐson et al. 1987: 4). When defined so widely deviance is the 
esseŶĐe of Ŷeǁs, ͚the defining characteristic of what journalists regard as 
ŶeǁsǁoƌthǇ͛ ;iďid.Ϳ. UŶsuƌpƌisiŶglǇ, giǀeŶ theiƌ ďƌoad defiŶitioŶ, EƌiĐsoŶ et al. found 
that a remarkably high proportion of Ŷeǁs ǁas aďout ͚deǀiaŶĐe aŶd ĐoŶtƌol͛, ƌaŶgiŶg 
from 45.3 per cent in a quality newspaper to 71.5 per cent on a quality radio station 
(Ericson et al. 1991: 239–42). Contrary to most other studies, they found that 
͚ƋualitǇ͛ ďƌoadĐastiŶg outlets had more deviance stories (both about violence and 
eĐoŶoŵiĐ ŵalpƌaĐtiĐeͿ, ďeĐause of ͚theiƌ paƌtiĐulaƌ eŵphasis oŶ deǀiaŶĐe aŶd 
ĐoŶtƌol iŶ puďliĐ ďuƌeauĐƌaĐies͛ ;iďid.Ϳ. “toƌies aďout Đƌiŵe iŶ the Ŷaƌƌoǁeƌ seŶse of 
violations of criminal law are a more limited but nonetheless generally high 
proportion of news, varying somewhat according to medium (e.g. radio, television, 
oƌ pƌiŶt jouƌŶalisŵͿ, ŵaƌket ;e.g. ͚ƋualitǇ͛ oƌ ͚populaƌ͛ jouƌŶalisŵͿ, aŶd ŵethodologǇ 
(e.g. do we only consider stories about specific criminal incidents or include reports, 
articles, or also include editorials about the state of crime and criminal justice 
generally).  
 
The proportion of crime news varies over time, and has generally increased in recent 
decades (albeit with persisting variations accoƌdiŶg to ͚ŵaƌket͛Ϳ. The fiƌst studǇ of 
crime news in Britain looked at crime news reporting in September 1938, 1955, and 
1967 (Roshier 1973), and found that on average 4 per cent of stories in the three 
newspapers sampled were about crime. More recent studies have found higher 
percentages of crime news, for example a study of six Scottish newspapers in 1981 
found that an average of 6.5 per cent of space was given to crime news (Ditton and 
Duffy 1983: 161; see also Smith 1984; Schlesinger et al. 1991: 411–15). This rise was 
confirmed by a later study comparing coverage of crime in 10 national daily 
Ŷeǁspapeƌs foƌ fouƌ ǁeeks fƌoŵ ϭϵ JuŶe ϭϵϴϵ ;Williaŵs aŶd DiĐkiŶsoŶ ϭϵϵϯͿ. ͚OŶ 
average, 12.7% of event-oƌieŶted Ŷeǁs ƌepoƌts ǁeƌe aďout Đƌiŵe͛ ;iďid.: ϰϬͿ. The 
propoƌtioŶ of spaĐe deǀoted to Đƌiŵe ǁas gƌeateƌ the ŵoƌe ͚doǁŶŵaƌket͛ the 
newspaper. The smallest proportion of crime news was 5.1 per cent in the Guardian; 
the largest was 30.4 per cent in the Sun (ibid.: 41). The reporting of white-collar 
crime tends to be ĐoŶĐeŶtƌated iŶ ͚ƋualitǇ͛ Ŷeǁspapeƌs aŶd is ofteŶ ƌestƌiĐted to 
specialist financial pages, sections, or newspapers (Stephenson-Burton 1995: 137–
ϰϰͿ, fƌaŵed iŶ ǁaǇs that ŵaƌk it off fƌoŵ ͚ƌeal͛ Đƌiŵe uŶless theǇ aƌe seŶsatioŶal 
celebrity-style stories that aƌe tƌeated as a foƌŵ of ͚iŶfotaiŶŵeŶt͛ ;Toŵďs aŶd WhǇte 
2001; Levi 2006). 
 
A long-term historical study examined a random sample of issues of The Times and 
the Mirror for each year between 1945 and 1991 (Reiner et al. 2003). It found a 
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generally upward (albeit fluctuating) trend in the proportion of stories focused on 
crime in both newspapers (from under 10 per cent in the 1940s to over 20 per cent 
in the 1990s). The sharpest increase occurred during the late 1960s, when the 
average annual proportion of crime stories almost doubled, from around 10 per cent 
to around 20 per cent in both papers. In both papers the proportion of stories about 
the criminal justice system, as distinct from the commission of criminal offences, has 
clearly increased since the Second World War. Criminal justice stories were on 
average 2 per cent of all stories in the Mirror between 1945 and 1951, and 3 per cent 
in The Times. By 1985–91 the average had increased to 6 per cent in the Mirror, and 
9 per cent in The Times. 
 
In conclusion, deviance and control in a broad sense are the very stuff of news. 
However, stories about the commission of particular offences are more common in 
͚populaƌ͛ Ŷeǁs outlets ;although foƌ offiĐial oƌ Đoƌpoƌate Đƌiŵe the ƌeǀeƌse is tƌueͿ. 
The proportion of news devoted to crime and criminal justice has increased over the 
last half-century. 
 
Deviant news: patterns 
 
Crime news exhibits remarkably similar patterns in studies conducted at many 
different times and places. From the earliest studies onwards, analyses of news 
reports have found that crimes of violence are featured disproportionately 
Đoŵpaƌed to theiƌ iŶĐideŶĐe iŶ offiĐial Đƌiŵe statistiĐs. IŶ the U“A ͚the ƌatio of 
violent-to-property crime stories appearing in the surveyed newspapers was 8 to 2; 
however, official statistics reflected a property-to-violent crime ratio of more than 9 
to ϭ duƌiŶg the suƌǀeǇ peƌiod͛ ;Maƌsh ϭϵϵϭ: ϳϯͿ. A siŵilaƌ patteƌŶ ǁas fouŶd iŶ 
fourteen other countries (ibid.: 74–6). Indeed a general finding has been the lack of 
relationship between patterns and trends in crime news and crime statistics (Beckett 
1997). 
 
The previously cited historical study of two British newspapers since the Second 
World War found that homicide was by far the most common type of crime 
reported, accounting for about one-third of all crime news stories throughout the 
period (Reiner et al 2000,2001,2003). Other violent crimes were the next most 
common. However, there were significant shifts in the proportion of stories 
featuring other sorts of crime. In particular there was a marked decline in the 
pƌopoƌtioŶ of stoƌies featuƌiŶg ͚ǀoluŵe͛ pƌopeƌtǇ Đƌiŵes suĐh as ďuƌglaƌǇ iŶ ǁhiĐh Ŷo 
violence occurred (these are of course the overwhelming majority of crimes 
according to official statistics and crime surveys, cf. Maguire, Chapter 8, this 
volume). During the 1940s and 1950s property crimes featured frequently in news 
stories, but after the mid-1960s they were hardly ever reported unless there was 
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some celebrity angle. On the other hand, some offences began to feature 
prominently in news stories only after the mid-1960s, notably drug offences, which 
by the 1990s accounted for about 10 per cent of all crime stories . 
 
Several studies confirm the pattern of increasing over-representation of violent and 
interpersonal (especially sex) crimes. Between 1951 and 1985 the number of rape 
trials in Britain increased nearly four times, from 119 to 450. In the same period, the 
number of rape cases reported in the press increased more than five times, from 28 
to 154. The percentage of rape cases reported jumped from 23.5 per cent in 1951 to 
34.2 per cent in 1985 (Soothill and Walby 1991: 20–22). In Northern Ireland press 
reporting of sex cases tripled during the 1980s and 1990s (Greer 2003). 
 
The proportion of news devoted to crime of different types, and the prominence 
with which it is presented, varies according to market and medium. In one month of 
1989, 64.5 per cent of British newspaper crime stories featured violence, while the 
British Crime Survey found that only 6 per cent of crimes reported by victims were 
violent (Williams and Dickinson 1993: 40). The percentage of stories dealing with 
crimes involving personal violence, and the salience they were given, was 
considerably greater in more downmarket newspapers (ibid.: 40–3). 
 
In Britain, the proportion of violent crimes reported in television news broadcasts is 
closer to the tabloid figure than the quality press, especially for local rather than 
national bulletins. One study found that the proportion of crime stories reporting 
non-seǆual ǀioleŶĐe agaiŶst the peƌsoŶ iŶ ͚ƋualitǇ͛, ͚ŵid-ŵaƌket͛, aŶd ͚taďloid͛ 
newspapers respectively was 24.7 per cent, 38.8 per cent, and 45.9 per cent. On 
national news bulletins it was 40 per cent; on local bulletins violent crime stories 
were 63.2 per cent of all crime news (Schlesinger et al. 1991: 412–15).  
 
Homicide in general is the most prominent crime in news stories, but the likelihood 
of particular cases being reported varies systematically. A recent study analysed the 
reporting of homicide in three British newspapers between 1993 and 1997 (Peelo et 
al. 2004). Of the 2,685 police-recorded homicides in this period, just under 40 per 
ĐeŶt ǁeƌe ƌepoƌted iŶ at least oŶe of the papeƌs studied ;iďid.: ϮϲϭͿ. ͚“eǆual 
homicides were most likely to be reported in all three newspapers, as were 
homicides where there was a clear motive for monetary gain, or a jealousy or 
ƌeǀeŶge ŵotiǀe͛ ;iďid.: ϮϳϮͿ. Least likelǇ to ďe ƌepoƌted ǁeƌe the ŵost ĐoŵŵoŶ 
hoŵiĐides, those aƌisiŶg out of ͚ƌage oƌ Ƌuaƌƌel͛ ;iďid.: ϮϲϵͿ. ViĐtiŵ ĐhaƌaĐteƌistiĐs 
were also important determinants of the likelihood of reporting. Homicides where 
the victim was a child (but not an infant), female, or of higher status were more 
likely to be reported (ibid.: 262–7). 
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An indirect consequence of the pattern of offences reported by news stories is an 
exaggeration of police success in clearing-up Đƌiŵe, ͚ďeĐause the poliĐe aƌe ŵoƌe 
suĐĐessful iŶ solǀiŶg ǀioleŶt Đƌiŵes thaŶ pƌopeƌtǇ Đƌiŵes͛ ;Maƌsh ϭϵϵϭ: ϳϯͿ. 
However, the representation of poliĐe suĐĐess is deĐliŶiŶg: the ͚Đleaƌ-up͛ ƌate iŶ 
news stories fell from 73 per cent in 1945–64 to 51 per cent in 1981–91 (Reiner et al. 
2003: 23). 
 
Most studies find that offenders and victims featuring in news reports are typically 
older and of higher status than those officially processed by the criminal justice 
system (Roshier 1973: 45–6; Reiner et al. 2003: 19–21). There is contradictory 
evidence about whether news reports disproportionately feature ethnic minority 
offenders (Graber 1980; Marsh 1991: 74; Sacco 1995: 143; Barlow 1998). Crime 
reports in local newspapers or broadcasting clearly focus more on ethnic minority 
and lower-status group suspects (Garofalo 1981: 324; Beckett and Sasson 2000: 79). 
͚‘ealitǇ͛ teleǀisioŶ pƌogƌaŵŵes also pƌeseŶt a ŵaƌked ǀaƌiatioŶ to ŶatioŶal Ŷeǁs 
reports in terms of the demography of the offenders portrayed, concentrating on 
stories with young, ethnic minority suspects (Oliver and Armstrong 1998). The one 
demographic characteristic of offenders which is overwhelmingly congruent in news 
stoƌies aŶd iŶ all otheƌ data souƌĐes oŶ Đƌiŵe is theiƌ geŶdeƌ: ͚ďoth Đƌiŵe statistiĐs 
and crime news portray offending as predominaŶtlǇ a ŵale aĐtiǀitǇ͛ ;“aĐĐo ϭϵϵϱ: 
143). 
 
Studies assessing the profile of victims in news stories are fewer in number than 
analyses of the representation of offenders. There is however a clear trend for 
victims to become the pivotal focus of news stories in the last three decades (Reiner 
et al. 2003), paralleling the increasing centrality of victims in criminal justice and 
criminology (see Hoyle, Chapter 14 in this volume) and crime fiction (Reiner et al. 
2000 and 2001). News stories exaggerate the crime risks faced by higher-status 
white people, as well as disproportionately representing women, children, or older 
people as victims  Mawby and Brown 1983; Chermak 1995; Chiricos et al. 1997; 
Beckett and Sasson 2000: 79–80; Greer 2003: 70–2; Reiner et al. 2003: 21–2; Peelo 
et al. 2004: 262–7). 
 
Another consistent finding is the predominance of stories about criminal incidents, 
rather than analyses of crime patterns or the possible causes of crime (Garofalo 
1981: 325; Marsh 1991: 76; Sasson 1995; Barlow 1998; Beckett and Sasson 2000: 80–
1; Greer 2003: 66–70). Although an aspect of the more general event-orientation 
that is paƌt of the ͚eteƌŶal ƌeĐuƌƌeŶĐe͛ of Ŷeǁs ;‘oĐk ϭϵϳϯͿ, the ͚ŵass ŵedia pƌoǀide 
citizens with a public awareness of crime . . . based upon an information-rich and 
knowledge-pooƌ fouŶdatioŶ͛ ;“heƌizeŶ ϭϵϳϴ: ϮϬϰͿ. AŶ iŵpoƌtaŶt eǆaŵple is the 
reporting of rape and other sex crimes, where issues of power and gender disappear 
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in the fascination with the demonization of individual offenders or victims (Soothill 
and Walby 1991; Lees 1995; Greer 2003). Stories with child homicide victims and/or 
perpetrators are particularly likely to be featured so prominently that they become 
long-running stories with a familiar cast of characters, regularly invoked as symbols 
of wider issues or the state of the nation, illustrated by the Moors murders, and the 
Jamie Bulger and Soham cases (Jones and Wardle 2007; Green 2008). 
 
The tendency to exclude analysis of broader structural processes or explanations is 
also evident in stories about political disorder (Halloran et al. 1970; Hall 1973: 232–
43; Sumner 1982; Tumber 1982; Cottle 1993; De Luca and Peeples 2006). The 
portrayal of political conflict such as riot or terrorism is often in terms of sheer 
criminality (Clarke and Taylor 1980; Hillyard 1982; Iyengar 1991: 24–46; Hutchinson 
and Lester 2006).  
 
There is a tendency in recent years for critical and campaigning groups to have more 
access to the media, partly because of the increasing politicization of law and order 
(Schlesinger and Tumber 1994; Reiner 2007 Chap.5; Downes and Morgan, Chapter 7, 
this volume; Cottle 2008). Although critical stories exposing malpractice by the police 
oƌ otheƌ ĐƌiŵiŶal justiĐe offiĐials aƌe ƌegulaƌlǇ puďlished, this ͚ǁatĐhdog͛ fuŶĐtioŶ has 
not served historically to undermine the legitimacy of criminal justice institutions. 
Corruption and other police deviance stories have tended to be situated within the 
͚oŶe ďad apple͛ fƌaŵeǁoƌk, ǁheƌeďǇ the eǆposuƌe of iŶdiǀidual ǁƌoŶgdoiŶg is 
interpreted as a testimony to the integrity of the system which dealt with it (Chibnall 
1977: ch. 5). As the volume of police deviance stories has increased in recent years 
(Reiner et al. 2003: 22–ϰͿ, the ͚oŶe ďad apple͛ stoƌǇ ďeĐoŵes haƌdeƌ to ƌeĐǇĐle. AŶ 
alternative damage-limitation narrative is to present scandals as stories of 
institutional reform. This acknowledges previous malpractice, but safeguards the 
legitimacy of the institution as it is portrayed as putting things right (Schlesinger and 
Tumber 1994: ch. 7).  
 
Recently, this narrative has been complicated by a shift in media emphasis from 
͚iŶstitutioŶal ƌefoƌŵ͛ as a ŵeaŶs of ƌe-legitiŵatioŶ to ͚iŶstitutioŶal failuƌe͛ as a 
systemic characteristic of publicly funded bodies and a key determinant of 
newsworthiness (Greer and McLaughlin, 2010). In a context of increased market 
competition, shrinking readerships and a decline in deference to authority, 
newspapers in particular have gone on the offensive. The press now routinely 
eŶgage iŶ ͚attaĐk jouƌŶalisŵ͛, Ƌuestioning the integrity of institutional power and 
seekiŶg, ofteŶ ǀia ͚tƌial ďǇ ŵedia͛, to houŶd seŶioƌ puďliĐ figuƌes out of offiĐe ;Gƌeeƌ 
and McLaughlin 2011).  
 
The content of crime fiction 
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Although there are some quantitative content analyses of film and television crime 
fiction,
1
 a variety of qualitative techniques and theoretical perspectives drawn from 
literary, film, and social theory have more frequently been used.
2
 The pattern of 
representation of crime in fictional stories, in all media, resembles the content 
analyses of crime news. 
 
Crime and detection have always been staples of modern literature, as Defoe, 
Fielding, Poe, and Dickens illustrate (Ousby 1976). Some authors have postulated an 
aŶĐieŶt aŶĐestƌǇ foƌ the deteĐtiǀe stoƌǇ. ͚We fiŶd spoƌadiĐ examples of it in Oriental 
folk-tales, in the Apocryphal Books of the Old Testament, in the play-scene in 
Hamlet; while Aristotle in his Poetics puts forward observations about dramatic plot-
construction which are applicable today to the construction of a deteĐtiǀe ŵǇsteƌǇ͛ 
;“aǇeƌs ϭϵϯϲ: ǀiiͿ. This ǁas ĐleaƌlǇ aŶ atteŵpt to eŵphasize the ͚sŶoďďeƌǇ͛ ƌatheƌ 
thaŶ the ͚ǀioleŶĐe͛ of the ĐlassiĐ ƌatioĐiŶatiǀe deteĐtiǀe stoƌǇ ;WatsoŶ ϭϵϳϭͿ. The 
dominant style of crime fiction has varied from the classic puzzle mystery 
exemplified by Dorothy Sayers and Agatha Christie, to the tougher private eye 
stories pioneered by Dashiell Hammett and Raymond Chandler, and the police 
procedurals of Ed McBain, Joseph Wambaugh, and others. One estimate suggests 
that ͚ďetǁeeŶ a Ƌuaƌter and a third of total paperback output could probably be put 
iŶto the ĐategoƌǇ of ͞thƌilleƌ͟ of oŶe kiŶd oƌ aŶotheƌ . . . since 1945, at least 10,000 
million copies of crime stories have been sold world-ǁide͛ ;MaŶdel ϭϵϴϰ: ϲϲ–7). 
 
Crime stories have also been a prominent genre in the cinema, the dominant mass 
medium of the first half of the twentieth century. As with its successors, television, 
video and now digital media, the cinema has been haunted by respectable fears 
about its portrayal of crime and violence (Barker and Petley 2001). The proportion of 
films about crime has fluctuated cyclically since the Second World War, but there is 
no long-term increase or decrease (Allen et al. 1997). In most years, around 20 per 
cent of all films are crime movies, and around half of all films have significant crime 
content. 
 
Radio was the main broadcasting medium of the first half of the twentieth century. 
Stories about crime and law enforcement were a popular part of radio drama, in 
Britain and North America, although never as dominant as they subsequently 
became on television (Shale 1996).  
 
                                                 
1
 Pandiani 1978; Carlson 1985; Lichter et al. 1994; Powers et al. 1996; Allen et al. 1998. 
2
 Chibnall and Murphy 1999; Leishman and Mason 2002; Rafter 2006; Reiner 2008, 2010 Chap.6; 
Rafter and Brown, 2011; are just some of the most recent analyses of crime fiction. 
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Stories about crime and law enforcement have saturated television ever since it 
became the leading broadcasting medium in the 1950s. By 1959 over one-third of 
American prime-time television was crime shows (Dominick 1978: 114). Crime shows 
are just as much a staple of British television. Since 1955 around 25 per cent of the 
most popular television shows in Britain in most years have been crime or police 
series. While there are sharp cyclical fluctuations, there is no long-term trend (Reiner 
et al. 2000 and 2001), but there have been changes in how crime and criminal justice 
are represented. 
 
The pattern of crime in fiction 
 
The pattern of fictional representations of crime is similar to that in news stories—
and shows similar discrepancies from the picture conveyed by official crime 
statistics. Murder and other violent crimes feature vastly more frequently than the 
property offences that predominate in official statistics. A historical analysis of the 
crime films that have done best at the British box office since the Second World War 
(Allen et al. 1998; Reiner et al. 2000 and 2001) found that murder was the primary 
crime (the McGuffin of the plot, in HitchcoĐk͛s teƌŵiŶologǇͿ iŶ the oǀeƌǁhelŵiŶg 
majority of films throughout the period. However, property offences provided the 
McGuffin in a significant minority of films up to the late 1960s, though seldom 
thereafter. Sex and drug offences began to appear as central aspects of narratives 
only after the late 1960s. Since then crime is represented increasingly as an all-
pervasive threat, not an abnormal, one-off intrusion into a stable order. Linked to 
this is the increasing prevalence in films of police heroes, signifying that crime has 
become sufficiently routine to provide employment for a large bureaucracy, not just 
a diversion for enthusiastic amateurs at country house weekends. 
 
The representation of violence has become increasingly graphic throughout the 
period since the Second World War. Up to the early 1970s hardly any films showed 
more than a minor degree of pain or suffering by victims—even if they were 
murdered! Since then an increasing proportion of films depict victims in severe 
torment (Reiner et al. 2001: 184; Rafter and Brown 2011). 
 
On television too, fictional narratives have always featured violent crimes most 
prominently, but are focusing on them even more. Studies of American television 
suggest that about two-thirds of crime on prime-time shows consists of murder, 
assault, or armed robbery (Lichter et al. 1994; Beckett and Sasson 2000: ch. 6).  
Ironically, in relation to property crime risks, television has become safer than the 
world presented in official statistics. Between 1955 and 1984, the average annual 
rate for serious property offences in the USA increased from 10 to 50 incidents per 
ϭ,ϬϬϬ people aĐĐoƌdiŶg to FBI data. Hoǁeǀeƌ, oŶ teleǀisioŶ ͚the ƌate foƌ seƌious 
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property crimes has remained steady at 20 incidents per 1,000 characters over the 
thiƌtǇ Ǉeaƌs of ouƌ studǇ͛ ;iďid.: ϮϴϰͿ. Thus ďetǁeeŶ ϭϵϱϱ aŶd ϭϵϲϰ the teleǀisioŶ 
property crime rate exceeded the official statistics, but since then it has fallen far 
behind them. There is also a trend for the cinema (and newspapers) to increasingly 
understate the risks of property crime (Allen et al. 1998: 65; Reiner et al. 2003: 18–
19). 
 
The character of crimes depicted in fiction is also vastly different from the officially 
ƌeĐoƌded patteƌŶ. While ŵost ͚ƌeal͛ ŵuƌdeƌs aƌe eǆteŶsioŶs of ďƌaǁls ďetǁeeŶ 
young men (Dorling 2004), or domestic disputes, in fiction murder is usually 
motivated by greed and calculation (Allen et al. 1998: 69). Rape and other sex crimes 
are also presented in opposite ways in fiction (or news) and criminal justice statistics 
(Greer 2003: ch. 7). Most rapes are perpetrated by intimates or acquaintances, but 
on television and other fiction (and in news stories), rape is usually committed by 
psychopathic strangers and involves extreme brutality, often torture and murder. 
 
While crime fiction presents property crime less frequently than the reality 
suggested by crime statistics, those it does portray are far more serious. Official 
statistics and victim surveys concur in calculating that the overwhelming majority of 
property crimes involve little or no loss or damage, and no physical threat or harm to 
the victim—indeed, there is usually no contact at all with the perpetrator. In fiction, 
however, most property crimes involve tightly planned, high-value, project thefts, 
and are frequently accompanied by violence. 
 
Related to the disproportionate emphasis on the most serious end of the crime 
spectrum is the portrayal of the demographic characteristics of offenders and 
victims. Offenders in fiction are primarily higher-status, white, middle-aged males 
(Pandiani 1978: 442–7; Garofalo 1981: 326; Lichter et al. 1994: 290–5; Reiner et al. 
ϮϬϬϬ aŶd ϮϬϬϭͿ. IŶteƌestiŶglǇ, the Ŷeǁ geŶƌe of ͚ƌealitǇ͛ iŶfotaiŶŵeŶt Đop shows 
such as Cops differs from this pattern, primarily presenting offenders as non-white, 
underclass youth (Fishman and Cavender 1998; Valverde 2006). The social 
characteristics of fictional victims are similar, but a higher proportion are female. The 
demographic profile of offenders and victims in fiction is the polar opposite of 
criminal justice statistics, apart from the maleness of most offenders (Surette 2010 
Đalls this ͚the laǁ of opposites͛Ϳ 
 
A final important feature of fictional crime is the high clear-up rate: media cops 
usually get their man in fifty minutes with commercial breaks. In a representative 
sample of movies since 1945, there was no film before 1952 in which criminals 
escaped capture, and hardly any up to the early 1970s. Thereafter, offenders get 
away with their crimes in an increasing number of films, albeit still a minority (Allen 
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et al. 1998: 185; Reiner et al. 2000 and 2001). Trends on television are similar, with 
the overwhelming majority of crimes cleared up by the police, but an increasing 
minority where they fail (Lichter et al. 1994: ch. 9.). 
 
The police and the criminal justice system are thus overwhelmingly portrayed in a 
positive light in popular fiction, as the successful protectors of victims against serious 
harm and violence. This continues to be so, although with increasing questioning of 
police success and integrity (Leishman and Mason 2003; Brown 2007; Cavender and 
Deutsch 2007; Reiner 2008). Although the majority of police characters in films and 
television shows are represented as sympathetic, honest, and just, there is an 
increasing portrayal of police deviance. Corrupt, brutal, and discriminatory police 
officers have become more common since the mid-1960s in films (Powers et al. 
1996: 113–16; Allen et al. 1998: 185–6) and television (Lichter et al. 1994: ch. 9), as 
has acceptance of routine police violation of legal restraints. 
 
Victims have moved from a shadowy and purely functional role in crime narratives to 
a pivotal position. Film and television stories focus increasingly on the plight of 
victims, whose suffering is portrayed more graphically and often constitutes the 
driving force of the story (Allen et al. 1998; Reiner et al. 2000 and 2001). Support for 
law enforcement and criminal justice is increasingly constructed in narratives by 
presenting them as defenders or avengers of victims with whose suffering the 
audience is invited to identify. 
 
Media representation of crime: a summary 
 
1. News and fiction stories about crime are prominent in all media. While there is 
evidence of increasing attention to crime in some parts of the media, overall this 
fascination has been constant throughout media history. 
2. News and fiction concentrate overwhelmingly on serious violent crimes against 
individuals, albeit with some variation according to medium and market. The 
proportion of different crimes represented is the inverse of official statistics. 
3. The demographic profile of offenders and victims in the media is older and higher 
status than those processed by the criminal justice system. Child victims and 
perpetrators are also represented disproportionately. 
4. The risks of crime as portrayed by the media are both quantitatively and 
qualitatively more serious than the official statistically recorded picture, although 
the media underplay the current probabilities of victimization by property crimes. 
5. The media generally present a very positive image of the success and integrity of 
the police, and criminal justice more generally. However, in both news and fiction 
there is a clear trend to criticism of law enforcement, in terms of both its 
effectiveness and its justice and honesty. While in the past the unbroken media 
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picture was that Crime Does Not Pay (the title of a series of short films produced by 
MGM between 1935 and 1947), this is increasingly called into question in 
contemporary news and fiction. 
6. Individual victims and their suffering increasingly provide the motive force of 
crime stories. 
 
 
THE CONSEQUENCES OF MEDIA IMAGES OF CRIME 
 
A vast body of (mainly positivistic)  research has sought to measure two possible 
consequences of media representations (which are not mutually exclusive): criminal 
behaviour (especially violence); and fear of crime (for a detailed critical survey see 
Howitt 1998: chs 1, 5–8, 10–11). 
 
There are many possible links in criminological theory between media 
representations and crime. The media may impact on how crimes are labelled; the 
motives, means and opportunities for offending; and the formal and informal 
controls militating against crime.  
 
Labelling 
 
Foƌ aŶ aĐt to ďe ͚ĐƌiŵiŶal͛ ;as distiŶĐt fƌoŵ haƌŵful, iŵŵoƌal, aŶtisoĐial, etĐ.Ϳ it has 
to be labelled as such. This involves the creation of a legal category. A recorded 
crime also requires the labelling of the act as criminal by citizens and/or law-
enforcement officers.  
 
The role of the media in developing new (and eroding old) categories of crime has 
been emphasized in most of the classic studies of the emergence of criminal law 
ǁithiŶ the ͚laďelliŶg͛ tƌaditioŶ. BeĐkeƌ͛s seŵiŶal Outsiders analysed the 1937 passage 
of the US Marijuana Tax Act, showing the use of the media as a tool of the Federal 
Buƌeau of NaƌĐotiĐs͛ ŵoƌal eŶtƌepƌeŶeuƌship ;BeĐkeƌ ϭϵϲϯ: Đh. ϳͿ. JoĐk YouŶg 
analysed how media representations amplified the deviance of drug-takers (Young 
ϭϵϳϭͿ. “taŶ CoheŶ ĐoiŶed the iŶflueŶtial ĐoŶĐept of ͚ŵoƌal paŶiĐ͛ iŶ his studǇ of hoǁ 
the media together with the police developed a spiral of respectable fear about 
͚ŵods͛ aŶd ͚ƌoĐkeƌs͛ ;CoheŶ ϭϵϳϮͿ. Hall et al.͛s aŶalǇsis of the ϭϵϳϯ moral panic 
aďout a supposedlǇ Ŷeǁ tǇpe of ƌoďďeƌǇ, ͚ŵuggiŶg͛, eŵphasized the ĐƌuĐial paƌt 
played by the media. Newspapers stimulated public anxiety, producing changes in 
policing and criminal justice that became a self-fulfilling spiral of deviancy 
amplification (Hall et al. 1978). 
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Many subsequent studies have illustrated the role of the media in shaping the 
boundaries of criminality by creating new categories of offence, or by changing 
perceptions and sensitivities, leading to fluctuations in apparent crime. For example, 
‘ogeƌ Gƌaef͛s Đeleďƌated ϭϵϴϮ flǇ-on-the-wall documentary about the Thames Valley 
Police was a key impetus to reform of police treatment of rape victims. This also 
contributed, however, to a rise in the proportion of victims reporting rape, and thus 
an increase in the recorded rate. Many other studies have documented media-
aŵplified ͚Đƌiŵe ǁaǀes͛ aŶd ͚ŵoƌal paŶiĐs͛ aďout laǁ aŶd oƌdeƌ.3  
 
Motive 
 
A crime will not occur unless someone is tempted, driven, or otherwise motivated to 
carry out the ͚laďelled͛ aĐt. The ŵedia featuƌe iŶ ŵaŶǇ of the ŵost ĐoŵŵoŶlǇ 
offered social and psychological theories of the formation of criminal dispositions. 
Probably the most influential sociologial theory of how criminal motives are formed 
is MeƌtoŶ͛s ǀeƌsioŶ of anomie theory (Merton 1938; Messner and Rosenfeld 2006; 
Reiner 2007: 9, 14-5, 84-5; Special Issue of Theoretical Criminology 11/1 2007; Rock, 
Chapter 2 in this volume). The media  present for universal emulation images of 
affluent lifestyles and a consumerist culture, accentuating relative deprivation and 
generating pressures to acquire ever higher levels of material success regardless of 
the legitimacy of the means used. Psychological theories of the formation of motives 
to commit offences also often feature media effects as part of the process. It has 
been claimed that the images of crime and violence presented by the media are a 
form of social learning, and may encourage crime by imitation or arousal effects 
(Livingstone 1996: 308). 
 
Means 
 
It has often been alleged that the media act as an open university of crime, 
spreading knowledge of criminal techniques. This is frequently claimed in relation to 
particular causes célèbres or horrific crimes. A notorious case was the allegation that 
the murderers of Jamie Bulger had been influenced by the video Child’s Play 3 in the 
manner in which they killed the unfortunate toddler (Jewkes 2010: 16). Video games 
such as Grand Theft Auto have been accused of being an especially potent source of 
learning about crime, as the player is placed in the subject position of a criminal 
(Hayward 2004: 172–3, 193–4). Despite much discussion, the evidence that these are 
major sources of crime is weak (Young 2004; Hargrave and Livingstone 2006). 
 
                                                 
3
 e.g. Recent overviews include: Critcher 2003, 2006; Carrabine 2008 Chap.8; Greer 2009 Part 5; 
Goode and Ben-Yehuda 2009; Special Issue of British Journal of Criminology 49/1 2009; Jewkes 2010 
Chap.3; Special Issue of Crime, Media, Culture: An International Journal 7/3 2011. 
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New forms of media have sometimes been seen as creating new means to commit 
crime. This concern has been particularly stimulated by the Internet, which is feared 
as facilitating all sorts of offences, from fraud, identity theft, child pornography and 
grooming children for sex, to organizing transnational crime and terrorism (Wall 
2001, 2007; Jewkes 2003, 2006; Yar 2006; Jewkes and Yar 2009). 
 
Opportunity 
 
The media may increase opportunities to commit offences by contributing to the 
development of a consumerist ethos, in which the availability of tempting targets of 
theft proliferates (Hayward 2004; Hallsworth 2005: 62–3, ch. 7; Hall, Winlow and 
AŶĐƌuŵ ϮϬϬϴͿ. TheǇ ĐaŶ also alteƌ ͚ƌoutiŶe aĐtiǀities͛, espeĐiallǇ in relation to the use 
of leisure time, which structure opportunities for offending (Cohen and Felson 1979). 
The domestic hardware and software of mass media use—TVs, videos, radios, CDs, 
personal computers, mobile phones—are the common currency of routine property 
crime, and their proliferation has been an important aspect of the spread of criminal 
opportunities. 
 
Absence of controls 
 
Motivated potential offenders, with the means and opportunities to commit 
offences, may still not carry out these crimes if effective social controls are in place. 
These might be external—the deterrent threat of sanctions represented in the first 
place by the police—or internal—the still, small voice of conscience—what Eysenck 
has Đalled the ͚iŶŶeƌ poliĐeŵaŶ͛. 
 
A regularly recurring theme of respectable anxieties about the criminogenic 
consequences of media images of crime is that they erode the efficacy of both 
external and internal controls. They may undermine external controls by derogatory 
representations of criminal justice, for example ridiculing its agents, a key complaint 
at least siŶĐe the daǇs of “hakespeaƌe͛s DogďeƌƌǇ, ǁith the peƌeŶŶial populaƌity of 
comic cops and constables. Serious representations of criminal justice might 
undermine its legitimacy by questioning the integrity and fairness, or the efficiency 
and effectiveness of the police. Negative representations of criminal justice could 
lesseŶ puďliĐ ĐoopeƌatioŶ ǁith the sǇsteŵ, oƌ poteŶtial offeŶdeƌs͛ peƌĐeptioŶ of the 
probability of sanctions, with the consequence of increasing crime. 
 
Probably the most frequently suggested line of causation between media 
representations and criminal behaviour is the allegation that the media undermine 
internalized controls, by regularly presenting sympathetic or glamorous images of 
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offending. In academic form this is found in psychological theories of disinhibition 
and desensitization (Wartella 1995: 309-12. 
 
Criminogenic media? the research evidence 
 
In a comprehensive review of the research literature, Sonia Livingstone noted that 
͚siŶĐe the ϭϵϮϬs thousaŶds of studies of ŵass ŵedia effeĐts haǀe ďeeŶ ĐoŶduĐted͛ 
(Livingstone 1996: 306). She added that even listing the references to research in the 
previous decade would exhaust the space allocated to her article (some twenty 
pages). Reviews of the literature regularly recycle the apotheosis of agnosticism 
represented by the conclusion of one major study from the ϭϵϲϬs: ͚foƌ soŵe 
children, under some conditions, some television is harmful. For some children 
under the same conditions, or for the same children under other conditions, it may 
be beneficial. For most children, under most conditions, most television is probably 
Ŷeitheƌ paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ haƌŵful Ŷoƌ paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ ďeŶefiĐial͛ ;“Đhƌaŵŵ et al. 1961: 11). 
 
This meagre conclusion from the expenditure of countless research hours and dollars 
is primarily a testimony to the limitations and difficulties of empirical social science. 
The armoury of possible research techniques for assessing directly the effects of 
media images on crime is sparse, and suffers from evident and long-recognized 
limitations. 
 
The archetypal technique has been some version of the classic experiment: a group 
of subjects are exposed to a media stimulus—say a film—and the response is 
measured, by comparing behaviour or attitudes before and after. In a characteristic 
example, children of four to five were shown a five-ŵiŶute filŵ iŶ the ƌeseaƌĐheƌ͛s 
office, and then taken to a room with toys and observed for 20 minutes through a 
one-way mirror (Bandura et al. 1961, 1963). The children were randomly assigned to 
watch one of three films, enacting scenarios in which a boy who attacked another 
boy and some toys was depicted as being rewarded, or punished, or neither. The 
children (especially the boys) who saw the film about the boy rewarded for his attack 
by getting all the toys, were observed to carry out twice as much imitative 
aggression as the other groups, but no more non-imitative aggression. 
 
This example shows all the problems of inferring conclusions about links between 
media and violence from laboratory-style experiments. Are the results a Hawthorn 
effect arising from the experimental situation itself? For instance, were the more 
aggressive children who saw a film in which aggression was rewarded influenced by 
their perception that the experimenter approved of such behaviour? How far can 
results from one context of viewing be extrapolated to others? Do experimental 
results exaggerate the links in the everyday world by picking up short-term effects of 
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media exposure that rapidly evaporate? Or do they underestimate the long-term 
cumulative effects of regular, repeated exposures by measuring only one-off results?  
 
Given the huge number of such experimental studies (using different forms of stimuli 
and different types of measures of response, for different sorts of subjects, at many 
different times and places) it is hardly surprising that there are variations in the 
extent of effect shown, if any. However, most studies do show some effect, and the 
few that conducted follow-ups over time found that while effects diminished by 
about 25 per cent over the fortnight or so after an experiment, they do not 
disappear (Livingstone 1996: 309–10). There are many suggestions in the 
experimental literature about what determines the degree of effect caused by media 
exposures. These include the perceived realism of the representation, whether 
violence or deviance was seen as justified, punished, or rewarded, whether the 
viewers identified with the perpetrator, the variable vulnerability or susceptibility of 
the viewer, and so on (ibid.). 
 
Typically, however, the effects of exposure to media stimuli in experimental 
situations are small. Interestingly, most of the research has looked at supposed 
negative effects of media, such as violence. The few studies that have examined the 
effeĐts of ͚pƌosoĐial͛ iŵages suggest that these aƌe ŵuĐh laƌgeƌ ;LiǀiŶgstoŶe ϭϵϵϲ: 
309). 
 
Given the limitations of laboratory experiments, some studies have tried to assess 
the effeĐts of ŵedia eǆposuƌe iŶ ͚Ŷatuƌal͛ eǀeƌǇdaǇ situatioŶs. OŶe ŵethod has ďeeŶ 
by looking at the introduction of some form of medium (usually television) in an area 
where it did not exist before. This was most frequently done in the 1950s, when the 
spread of television ownership, first in the USA, then in the UK, provided the 
opportunity of a once-and-for-all natural experiment. One study of matched sets of 
34 US cities in the early 1950s found that larceny increased by about 5 per cent in 
those cities where television was introduced for the first time, compared to cities 
without TV or those that had been receiving it for some time (Hennigan et al. 1982). 
However, British research in the same period does not find similar effects on 
deviance (Livingstone 1996: 312–13). Since the virtually universal availability of 
television, such natural experiments are seldom possible. One rare example found 
that ĐhildƌeŶ͛s ǀeƌďal aŶd phǇsiĐal aggression increased in a Northern Canadian town 
after television was introduced, compared to two towns with established television 
(Williams 1986). While such natural experiments do not suffer from the artificiality of 
their laboratory counterparts, they are of course less completely controlled: the 
possibility can never be ruled out that differences between areas (even if roughly 
matched) were due to factors other than television. 
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Several studies have compared the viewing patterns of known offenders and 
(supposed) non-offenders. Some have concluded that more exposure to television is 
related to greater aggressiveness (Wartella 1995: 307–9); others that the viewing 
preferences of delinquents are remarkably similar to the general pattern for their 
age (Hagell and Newburn 1994). Neither conclusion is free from the possibility of 
other, unmeasured factors explaining either the association or the lack of it. 
 
There is also evidence that abuses of power by police and other criminal justice 
agents may be affected ďǇ ŵedia ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶs. OŶe studǇ of ͚ƌealitǇ͛ teleǀisioŶ 
programmes such as Cops suggested that the police may adopt forms of entrapment 
or illicit punishment of offenders to ensure good video footage for such shows 
(Doyle 1998: 110–12, 2003).  
 
Conversely, the influence of reality and fictional forensic and crime science 
programmes – CSI: Crime Scene Investigation being the prime example – on public 
expectations of criminal justice has been the subject of much speculation, and some 
research. The key concern is that that jurors who see the high-quality forensic 
evidence presented on CSI have increased expectations in real trials, where the 
actual available evidence tends to be much more uncertain. Though evidence of a 
CSI effect on trial juries is at best equivocal (Tyler 2006), research does indicate some 
impact on public expectations of the police, leading to unrealistic requests for hi-
tech investigative miracles at crime scenes (Huey 2010).  
 
The big fix: the media-crime connection 
 
Reviews of the ƌeseaƌĐh liteƌatuƌe geŶeƌallǇ ͚ĐoŶĐlude that theƌe is a ĐoƌƌelatioŶ 
between violence viewing and aggressive behaviour, a relationship that holds even 
ǁheŶ a ǀaƌietǇ of ĐoŶtƌols aƌe iŵposed͛ ;Waƌtella ϭϵϵϱ: ϯϬϲͿ. Hoǁeǀeƌ, the oǀeƌall 
negative effects of media exposure seem to be small compared to other features in 
the soĐial eǆpeƌieŶĐe of offeŶdeƌs. Thus ͚the ƋuestioŶ that ƌeŵaiŶs is Ŷot ǁhetheƌ 
media violence has an effect, but rather how important that effect has been, in 
comparison with other factors, in bringing about major social changes such as the 
post-ǁaƌ ƌise iŶ Đƌiŵe͛ ;iďid.: ϯϭϮͿ. 
 
One problem with most of the effects debate and research is that it has often been 
directed at a rather implausible notion (Brown 2003: 27–9). What has been at issue 
is the will-o͛-the-ǁisp of a ͚puƌe͛ ŵedia effeĐt. The iŵpliĐit ŵodel ǁas of the ŵedia 
as hypodermic syringe, injecting ideas and values into a passive public of cultural 
dopes. Audiences are not passive recipients, however, but active interpreters, in a 
complex process of interaction with other cultural and social practices (Livingstone 
et al. 2001). Changes in media representations do not come fully formed from 
another planet and affect behaviour patterns ex nihilo, but reflect ongoing changes 
in social perceptions and practices. Changing media images are interpreted by 
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different audiences in various ways, which may reinforce or alter emerging social 
patterns. The relationship between developments in the media and in the wider 
society is a dialectical one. While this makes the isolation and measurement of pure 
media effects chimerical, it certainly does not imply that media representations have 
Ŷo sigŶifiĐaŶt ĐoŶseƋueŶĐes. ͚Most ŵedia ƌeseaƌĐheƌs ďelieǀe that the ŵedia haǀe 
significant effects, even though they are hard to demonstrate, and most would agree 
that the media make a significant contribution to the social construction of reality. 
The problem is to move beyond this platitude . . . The study of enculturation 
processes, which work over long time periods, and which are integral to rather than 
separate from other forms of social determination, would not ask how the media 
ŵake us aĐt oƌ thiŶk, ďut ƌatheƌ hoǁ the ŵedia ĐoŶtƌiďute to ŵakiŶg us ǁho ǁe aƌe͛ 
[Livingstone 1996: 31–2]. 
 
A further limitation of the effects literature is that it has been almost exclusively 
concerned with the consequences of violent and other representations of deviance. 
The theoretical connections examined earlier suggest that media representations of 
non-law-breaking behaviour, for example advertising and other images of 
consumerist lifestyles, may increase anomie and hence offending. The most plausible 
criminogenic implications of media representations concern how they impact on 
material aspirations and conceptions of legitimate means of achievement, not how 
they depict crime or violence directly. 
 
The media and fear of crime 
 
In recent years policy debates have identified fear of crime as an issue potentially as 
serious as crime itself (Ditton and Farrell 2000; Hope and Sparks 2000; Jackson 2004; 
Ditton et al. 2004; Chadee and Ditton 2005). Concern is not just about the 
unnecessary pain of excessive anxiety, nor even the damage done to trust and social 
relations by fear and the prevention strategies it encourages.  
 
IŶ the ͚ĐultiǀatioŶ aŶalǇsis͛ tƌaditioŶ ǁhiĐh GeƌďŶeƌ aŶd his assoĐiates haǀe ďeeŶ 
developing for thirty years, media images of crime and violence are a threat to 
democracy (Gerbner 1970, 1995). Fearful people are more dependent, more easily 
manipulated and controlled, more susceptible to deceptively simple, strong, tough 
measures and hard-line postures—both political and religious. They may accept and 
even welcome repression if it promises to relieve their insecurities and other 
anxieties (Signorielli 1990: 102). When reel-world violence is compared to real-world 
crime as measured by official statistics, it appears that the media images exaggerate 
the pƌoďaďilitǇ aŶd seǀeƌitǇ of daŶgeƌ. This is said to ͚Đultiǀate͛ a ŵisleadiŶg ǀieǁ of 
the world based on unnecessary anxiety about levels of risk from violent crime (ibid.: 
96–102). 
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There has been extensive criticism of the empirical and theoretical validity of these 
claims (Howitt 1998: ch. 4; Greer 2009 Part 5). How much of the association between 
measures of exposure to the media and of fearfulness survives the introduction of 
other control variables such as class, race, gender, place of residence, and actual 
experience of crime (Doob and MacDonald 1979; Chadee 2001; Roberts 2001)? 
Could any association between viewing and fearfulness result from the opposite 
causal process, that is, do more fearful viewers watch more television rather than 
ǀiĐe ǀeƌsa? Moƌe geŶeƌallǇ, it appeaƌs that ͚ĐultiǀatioŶ͛ does Ŷot eǆpoƌt ǁell. Bƌitish 
attempts to replicate the Gerbner findings have failed to do so (Wober 1978; Gunter 
1985). 
 
Although the debate about the empirical validity of the cultivation hypothesis 
continues, there is only limited evidence from other studies to confirm the plausible 
idea that exposure to media images is associated with fear of crime. An extensive 
multivariate analysis concluded that there was a significant relationship between 
reading newspapers with more emphasis on violent crime and measures of 
fearfulness expressed in a survey (Williams and Dickinson 1993). This association 
survived control by a number of demographic variables, such as socio-economic 
status, gender, and age. However, this association was not found with behavioural 
concomitants of fear, such as going out after dark. Neither could the study rule out 
the possibility that fear led to heavier readership of newspapers with more crime, 
rather than vice versa. On the empirical issue, while it remains a reasonable 
hypothesis that much public fear of crime is created or accentuated by media 
exposure, the research evidence remains equivocal about the strength, or even 
existence, of such a causal relationship (Ditton et al. 2004; Chadee and Ditton 2005). 
Most studies have not examined how frequently people experience fear, as opposed 
to their responses to particular surveys (Farrall and Gadd 2004). 
 
Much of this inconclusiveness is rooted in the theoretical limitations of positivist 
content analysis (Sparks 1992: ch. 4). Items of violence are collated according to 
operational definitions used by observers, without reference to the narrative 
contexts within which they are embedded. Most stories have conclusions concurring 
ǁith Miss Pƌisŵ͛s Đeleďƌated defiŶitioŶ of fiĐtioŶ: ͚The good eŶded happilǇ, aŶd the 
ďad uŶhappilǇ͛ ;OsĐaƌ Wilde, The Importance of Being Earnest, Act II). Although 
there is a trend towards greater ambivalence and ambiguity, most crime stories still 
have an underlying emphasis on just resolutions of conflict and violence (Zillman and 
Wakshlag 1987; Reiner et al. 2000 and 2001). It is not obvious that exposure to high 
degrees of violence en route to a happy ending has a fear-eŶhaŶĐiŶg effeĐt. ͚WheŶ 
suspenseful drama featuring victimisation is known to contain a satisfying resolution, 
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apprehensive individuals should anticipate pleasure and enjoyment͛ ;Wakshlag et al. 
1983: 238). 
 
QuaŶtitatiǀe assessŵeŶts of the ƌelatioŶship ďetǁeeŶ ͚oďjeĐtiǀelǇ͛ ŵeasuƌed uŶits 
of media content and survey responses cannot begin to understand the complex and 
dynamic interdependence of the differential experiences of crime, violence, and risk 
of different social groups and their subjective interpretations of the meaning of 
texts. The subtle intertwinings of differential social positions and life experiences 
with the reception of media texts is only beginning to be addressed by studies of 
content and interpretation. These use qualitative methods and ways of reading that 
seek to be sensitive to the complexities of analysing meaning (Sparks 1992, 2000, 
2001; Schlesinger et al. 1992; Livingstone et al. 2001; Ditton et al. 2004). As with the 
issue of the effects of media images on criminality, so too with fear, the issue is not 
whether media representations have consequences. Hardly anyone would deny this. 
The agenda is the unravelling of the complex interrelationship of media content and 
other dimensions of social structure and experience in shaping offending behaviour, 
fear of crime, and the politics of law and order (Sasson 1995; Beckett 1997; Girling et 
al. 2000; Cavender 2004; Reiner 2007: 141-51). 
 
 
THE CAUSES OF MEDIA REPRESENTATIONS OF CRIME  
 
Theoretical perspectives come and go, and drift in and out of academic favour. 
Theoretical concepts, in contrast, exist independently of the various perspectives 
within which they may be situated. One concept utilised by almost all crime news 
studies, regardless of other methodological and theoretical differences, is that of 
͚ŶeǁsǁoƌthiŶess͛. This ĐoŶĐept, theƌefoƌe, pƌoǀides a useful staƌtiŶg poiŶt foƌ 
understanding the causes of media representations of crime.  
 
 
CRIME NEWSWORTHINESS  
 
Neǁs ĐoŶteŶt is geŶeƌated aŶd filteƌed pƌiŵaƌilǇ thƌough ƌepoƌteƌs͛ seŶse of 
͚ŶeǁsǁoƌthiŶess͛, ǁhat ŵakes a good stoƌǇ that theiƌ audieŶĐe ǁaŶts to kŶoǁ 
about. The first academic exploration of newsworthiness was conducted by 
Norwegian media researchers Galtung and Ruge (1965), and resulted in the 
ideŶtifiĐatioŶ of tǁelǀe ͚Ŷeǁs ǀalues͛ that ǁoƌk ĐolleĐtiǀelǇ to iŶfoƌŵ the seleĐtioŶ 
and production of events as news. Core values include immediacy, dramatization, 
personalization, titillation, and novelty (see also Chibnall 1977: 22–45; Jewkes 2010: 
ch. 2 offers an elaborated set). The primacy of these news values explains the 
predominant emphasis on violent and sex offences, and the concentration on higher 
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status offenders and victims, especially celebrities. It also accounts for the tendency 
to avoid stories about crime trends and patterns. These news values also encourage 
the presentation of political violence or disorder in terms of individual pathology 
rather than ideological opposition; as discrete criminal events, not manifestations of 
structural conflict (Halloran et al. 1970; Hall 1973; Lawrence 2000: ch. 3). 
 
͚Whateǀeƌ the iŶflueŶĐes oŶ Ŷeǁ oƌgaŶizatioŶs that affeĐt theiƌ seleĐtioŶ aŶd 
rejection of particular stories, daily newsreaders have an independent fascination 
ǁith the stoƌies that aƌe puďlished͛ ;Katz, ϭϵϴϳ: ϰϴͿ. AŶ alteƌŶatiǀe ƌeadiŶg of Đƌiŵe 
newsworthiness focuses on the symbolic relevance and psycho-social utility of crime 
news for media consumers. From this perspective, crime is not newsworthy because 
it shocks, frightens or titillates. Rather, its reporting offers consumers the 
opportunity to engage in daily ritual moral workouts to test their own moral 
foƌtitude. Cƌiŵe Ŷeǁs ͚speaks dƌaŵatiĐallǇ to issues that are of direct relevance to 
ƌeadeƌs͛ eǆisteŶtial ĐhalleŶges, ǁhetheƌ oƌ Ŷot ƌeadeƌs aƌe pƌeoĐĐupied ǁith the 
possiďle peƌsoŶal ŵisfoƌtuŶe of ďeĐoŵiŶg ǀiĐtiŵs to Đƌiŵe͛ ;Katz, ϭϵϴϳ: ϲϴͿ.  
 
While a grasp of newsworthiness is crucial to understanding the reporting of crime, it 
is insufficient on its own to explain the content of crime news. For a deeper 
understanding of the processes and priorities that produce the pattern of 
representation of crime, researchers have turned to analysing the news production 
process.  
 
 
CRIME NEWS AS HEGEMONY IN ACTION  
 
Most of the early studies of crime news production supported a version of the 
hegemonic or control model. CoŶtƌol appƌoaĐhes aƌe iŶﬂueŶĐed ďǇ Maƌǆist aŶd 
critical theory, and stress the unequal distribution of economic and cultural power 
throughout society. From this perspective, the role of news media is to reproduce 
dominant ideology, legitimate the capitalist system, and promote the interests of the 
ruling elite to the extent that their ways of seeing the ǁoƌld ďeĐoŵe ͚hegeŵoŶiĐ͛. In 
addition to the important role of news values, the key drivers of news production are 
seen as: the political ideology of the press, and; the structural-cultural determinants 
of news-making.  
 
The political ideology of the press 
 
The majority of newspapers have a more or less overtly C/conservative political 
ideology, and individual reporters are aware of this whatever their personal leanings. 
The broadcasting media, especially the BBC, are characterized by an ethic of political 
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neutrality and professional objectivity in performing a public service of providing 
news information. In practice, however, this becomes a viewpoint which takes for 
granted certain broad beliefs and values, those of moderate, middle-of-the-road 
majority opinion—ǁhat “tuaƌt Hall suĐĐiŶĐtlǇ Đalled a ͚ǁoƌld at oŶe ǁith itself ͛ ;Hall 
ϭϵϳϬͿ. The ŵasteƌ ĐoŶĐepts of this ǁoƌldǀieǁ iŶĐlude suĐh ŶotioŶs as the ͚ŶatioŶal 
iŶteƌest͛, the ͚Bƌitish ǁaǇ of life͛, aŶd the ͚deŵoĐƌatiĐ pƌoĐess͛ as epitoŵized ďǇ 
Westminster.  
 
The implications of this prevailing worldview informed critical research in the 1970s 
which sought to demonstrate how broadcast and press reporting of crime, deviance 
and control marginalises dissenting voices and reinforces ruling class interests. 
Halloran, Elliott and Murdock (1970) analysed press and television reporting of the 
ϭϵϲϴ VietŶaŵ deŵoŶstƌatioŶs iŶ LoŶdoŶ͛s GƌosǀeŶoƌ “Ƌuaƌe to illustƌate the 
ŵedia͛s ƌole iŶ ͚defiŶiŶg the situatioŶ aŶd iŶ ĐultiǀatiŶg the assuŵptioŶ that this is 
the way it is͛. The deŵoŶstƌatioŶs ǁeƌe defiŶed eaƌlǇ oŶ as likelǇ to iŶǀolǀe ǀioleŶĐe 
between the forces of law and order (the police) and the forces of anarchy (the 
demonstrators). Though the protests turned out to be largely peaceful, the event 
was still reported iŶ liŶe ǁithiŶ the ͚fƌaŵeǁoƌk of ǀioleŶĐe͛, aŶd thus it ǁas the issue 
of ǀioleŶĐe, ŵiŶiŵal though it ǁas, that pƌoǀided ͚the Ŷeǁs͛. In their analyses of 
television news coverage of industrial disputes, The Glasgow University Media Group 
(1976, 1980; see also Eldridge, 2006) found a dearth of alternative viewpoints and 
concluded that jouƌŶalists ͚aĐtiǀelǇ eŵďƌaĐe͛ the doŵiŶaŶt ideologiĐal ǀieǁpoiŶt ͚iŶ 
a ǁaǇ that ǁould ďe haƌd to justifǇ as iŵpaƌtial͛. Theiƌ aĐtiǀities iŶĐlude ͚Ŷot oŶlǇ the 
agenda-setting functions we have described, but also a systematic partiality in the 
ƌepoƌtiŶg aŶd iŶteƌpƌetiǀe use of goǀeƌŶŵeŶt statistiĐs͛ ;ϭϵϴϬ: ϰϬϭͿ. Hall et al (1978) 
eǆploƌed the geŶeƌatioŶ of a ͚ŵoƌal paŶiĐ͛ ;see also CoheŶ ϭϵϳϮ/ϮϬϬϮͿ aƌouŶd 
͚ŵuggiŶg͛ iŶ the ŵidst of deep economic recession and an emergent crisis in state 
hegemony. They show how sensational media coverage simultaneously tapped into 
eǆistiŶg feaƌs aƌouŶd laǁ aŶd oƌdeƌ, ƌaĐe aŶd soĐial deĐliŶe, aŶd Đƌeated a ͚folk deǀil͛ 
– the young black street criminal – agaiŶst ǁhoŵ all ͚ƌespeĐtaďle͛ people Đould 
unite. These exceptional times called for exceptional measures. The moral panic 
created the right conditions for the state to step-in while simultaneously stepping-up 
its authoritarianism, relegitimating itself and re-establishing hegemonic control by 
cracking down hard on the perceived crime problem (Crime Media Culture Special 
Issue 2008).  
 
These early studies demonstrated that crime reporting is not only highly selective, 
but also politically oriented toward the reproduction of dominant ideology. The 
͚ŵaŶufaĐtuƌe of Ŷeǁs͛ ;CoheŶ aŶd YouŶg ϭϵϳϯ/ϭϵϴϭ; “heƌizaŶ ϭϵϳϴͿ foƌ a ŵass 
audience involves a simultaneous narrowing of otherwise distinct behaviours and 
practices into a simplified category of crime. Political and industrial conflict tend to 
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ďe ǀieǁed as ďeiŶg peƌpetƌated ďǇ ͚ŵiŶdless ŵilitaŶts͛ ŵaŶipulated ďǇ eǆtƌeŵist 
ŵiŶoƌities seekiŶg ͚aŶaƌĐhǇ͛ aŶd suďǀeƌsioŶ, ǁith oŶlǇ the ͚thiŶ ďlue liŶe͛ to saǀe the 
day for law and order (Chibnall 1977: 21; see also Greer and McLaughlin, 2010). 
Politically subversive behaviours are depoliticised and assimilated to routine crime: 
both are portrayed as pathological conditions unrelated to wider social structures 
(Clarke and Taylor 1980; Hillyard 1982; Iyengar 1991; Lawrence 2000: 57–60).  
 
Furthermore, traditional crime reporters explicitly saw it as their responsibility to 
present the police and the criminal justice system in as favourable a light as possible. 
As oŶe put it: ͚If I͛ǀe got to Đoŵe doǁŶ oŶ oŶe side oƌ the otheƌ, eitheƌ the goodies 
oƌ the ďaddies, theŶ oďǀiouslǇ I͛d Đoŵe doǁŶ oŶ the side of the goodies, iŶ the 
iŶteƌests of laǁ aŶd oƌdeƌ͛ ;ChiďŶall ϭϵϳϳ: ϭϰϱͿ. This of Đouƌse did Ŷot ŵeaŶ that 
even the most pro-police crime reporter would not pursue stories of police 
malpractice as assiduously as possible. But it generated a tendency to present these 
ǁithiŶ a ͚oŶe ďad apple͛ fƌaŵeǁoƌk ;iďid.: Đh. ϱͿ.  
 
Structural-cultural determinants of news-making 
 
The reporting of crime, deviance and control is further influenced by variety of 
concrete organizational pressures that have unintended consequences, bolstering 
the law and order stance of most crime news stories. For example, concentrating 
personnel at institutional settings like courts, where newsworthy events can be 
expected to recur regularly, is an economic use of reporting resources. But it has the 
unintended consequence of concentrating on cleared-up cases, creating a misleading 
sense of police effectiveness  (Ericson et al, 1991; Leishman and Mason, 2003). 
 
The police and the criminal justice system control much of the information on which 
crime reporters rely, and this gives them a degree of power as essential accredited 
sources. News production is structurally oriented, in the name of journalistic 
͚oďjeĐtiǀitǇ͛ aŶd ͚iŵpaƌtialitǇ͛, to appeal fiƌst to aĐĐƌedited eǆpeƌts ǁho ĐoŵŵaŶd 
cultural and institutional power. This places powerful groups in the position to 
estaďlish ͚aŶ iŶitial defiŶitioŶ oƌ primary interpretation of the topiĐ iŶ ƋuestioŶ͛ ;Hall 
et al, 1978: 58; Lawrence, 2000: ch. 8). Once the primary definition has been 
established it is extremely difficult to override, and future debate is contained within 
a foƌuŵ of ͚ĐoŶtƌolled disĐouƌse͛, goǀeƌŶed ďǇ the pƌiŵaƌǇ defiŶeƌs. Crime reporters 
tend to develop a symbiotic relationship with the contacts and organizations they 
use regularly, especially the police (Chibnall 1977: ch. 3 and 6), as the recent 
revelations about the Murdoch newspapers have underlined. But ͚the jouƌŶalist is 
always in an inferior negotiating position – the journalist who cannot get information 
is out of a joď, ǁheƌeas the poliĐeŵaŶ ǁho ƌetaiŶs it is Ŷot͛ ;ChiďŶall, ϭϵϳϳ: ϭϱϱͿ.  
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The need to produce reports to fit the time schedules of news production 
contributes to their event-orientation, the concentration on specific crimes at the 
expense of analysis of causal processes or policies (Rock 1973: 76–9; Lawrence 2000: 
ch. 8). Considerations of personal safety and convenience lead cameramen covering 
riots typically to film from behind police lines, which unintentionally structures an 
iŵage of the poliĐe as ǀulŶeƌaďle ͚us͛ thƌeateŶed ďǇ ŵeŶaĐiŶg ͚theŵ͛ ;MuƌdoĐk 
1982: 108–9; Schlesinger et al. 1993).  
 
In sum, the control model sees news content as the largely unintended but 
determined consequence of the structure, culture and political economy of news 
pƌoduĐtioŶ. ͚JouƌŶalists aƌe Ŷot necessarily biased towards the powerful—but their 
ƌoutiŶe assuŵptioŶs ŵake theŵ ǁilliŶg ĐoŶduits of that poǁeƌ͛ ;MĐNaiƌ ϮϬϬϵ: ϱϵͿ.  
 
 
CRIME NEWS AS NEGOTIATED CONTROL   
 
Organisational interdependence and contingency  
 
From the 1980s researcher sought to develop a deeper and more nuanced 
appreciation of the news production process. Empirical studies were based on 
interviews with reporters and other creative personnel, or the police (e.g. Fishman 
1981; Ross 1998; Mawby 1998, 1999, 2001, 2002; Innes 1999, 2001; Greer 2003), 
and/or observation (Ericson et al. 1987, 1989, 1991; Schlesinger et al. 1991; 
Schlesinger and Tumber 1992, 1993, 1994; Chermak 1995, 1998; Skidmore 1996; 
Doyle 1998, 2003). This research suggests that the deterministic implications of the 
hegemonic model require qualification. The underpinning idea that, in the last 
iŶstaŶĐe, the Ŷeǁs ŵedia opeƌate as a ͚laƌgelǇ uŶĐƌitiĐal ĐoŶduit foƌ offiĐial ǀieǁs͛ 
(Schlesinger et al. 1983: 166) has been a particular point of contention.  
 
Earlier research consistently reaffirmed the asymmetrical relations between 
jouƌŶalists aŶd poǁeƌful souƌĐes ďeĐause it ǁas ͚gƌouŶded iŶ the peƌspeĐtiǀe of 
jouƌŶalists͛ ;EƌiĐsoŶ et al, ϭ987: 125), thus overlooking the important levels of 
͚ĐoŶǀeƌgeŶĐe͛ ďetǁeeŶ ŵedia aŶd souƌĐe oƌgaŶisatioŶs. CoŶsideƌatioŶ of souƌĐe 
perspectives reveals that the police, for example, are constrained by news discourses 
just as journalists are constrained by poliĐe disĐouƌses: ͚poliĐe-reporter transactions 
eŶtail ĐoŶtƌols fƌoŵ ďoth sides, aŶd iŶteƌdepeŶdeŶĐǇ͛ ;EƌiĐsoŶ et al, ϭϵϴϵ: ϭϮϱͿ. 
Whilst the poliĐe ͚ĐoŶtƌolled the pƌiŵaƌǇ defiŶitioŶs of the suďjeĐt of addƌess ;Đƌiŵe, 
criminality and its control by the police), they sensed a loss of control over the 
speĐifiĐ teƌŵs of the ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ pƌoĐess͛ ;EƌiĐsoŶ et al, ϭϵϴϵ: ϭϮϯͿ.  
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There is also greater diversity, negotiation, and contingency in the use of sources. 
These range far beyond the accredited agencies of the formal criminal justice 
institutions (Schlesinger and Tumber 1994; Greer 2003: 32–3). Groups critical of the 
establishment (such as penal reform or civil liberties groups) are given a voice, 
depending in part on their organizational and presentational skills, their hold on 
interesting knowledge, and on medium and market differences.  
 
News stories vary in character. Many are routine fillers, where a clearly established 
paradigm is followed, albeit with new names, dates, and details each time. But there 
are also systematic variations between news stories in different media and markets. 
This is partly because they have different variants of political and professional 
journalistic ideology according to patterns of ownership (state versus private, for 
example) and perceived audience (business or policy elites, other opinion leaders, 
liberal professionals, or a mass public seeking entertainment; local or national). 
These are interconnected with differences in technological resources, budgetary 
limitations, and the diffeƌeŶt ͚gƌaŵŵaƌs͛ of ǁƌitteŶ aŶd spokeŶ laŶguage, still aŶd 
moving pictures.  
 
There is always a tension between two contradictory pressures. The highest 
jouƌŶalistiĐ aĐĐolade is the ͚sĐoop͛, ƌepoƌtiŶg a high-news-value story that has not 
yet been reported. This exerts pressure to be ahead of the pack, to seek out sources 
that no rivals have yet found. However, the worst possible scenario is to miss 
important information that everybody else has. This generates a tendency to hunt 
with the pack, mining the same sources as rivals. The fear of failure usually prevails 
over the lure of the scoop, on minimax principles, which is why front pages tend to 
be so similar.  
 
In recent years the production of crime news (like news in general) has been 
transformed by a decline in the use of specialist reporters, including court and crime 
correspondents. This is due to the increasing news emphasis on celebrities, and the 
increasingly commercial orientation of the multimedia conglomerates that own most 
news outlets, which has restricted editorial budgets severely. Many crime and 
criminal justice stories, cases, and issues now fail to get aired prominently or 
perhaps at all, even in the sensationalist manner that used to be a core news staple 
(Davies 1999). Crime news increasingly shares in the dominant celebrity culture. 
Stories with famous victims or perpetrators are the acme of news value. Some crime 
victims achieve celebrity through media coverage of their cases. The global 
phenomenon that has been the disappearance of Madeleine McCann is one case in 
point.  
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There is thus scope for flexibility and judgement in the selection and production of 
crime news; the newsroom is not characterized by normative consensus but by 
negotiation and conflict between reporters, editors, and sources. In this context, the 
doŵiŶaŶĐe of aŶǇ ideologiĐal positioŶ should ďe ĐoŶsideƌed aŶ ͚aĐhieǀeŵeŶt ƌatheƌ 
thaŶ a ǁhollǇ stƌuĐtuƌallǇ deteƌŵiŶed outĐoŵe͛ ;“chlesinger, 1989: 79).  
 
While empirical analyses of news production emphasize its contingency and fluidity, 
they do not fundamentally challenge the hegemonic model. They confirm the 
structuring of news-gathering and presentation around a sense of news values and 
other criteria leading to the selection of particular types of stories and perspectives. 
These ĐoŶstitute a ͚ǀoĐaďulaƌǇ of pƌeĐedeŶts͛: Ŷot haƌd aŶd fast ƌules, ďut ͚ǁhat 
pƌeǀious eǆeŵplaƌs tell theŵ should ďe doŶe iŶ the pƌeseŶt iŶstaŶĐe͛ ;EƌiĐsoŶ et al. 
1987: 348). JouƌŶalists aŶd souƌĐes eŶgage iŶ ͚legitiŵatioŶ ǁoƌk͛ iŶ the 
representation of crime and justice. News contributes to the formation of a stable 
͚sǇŵďoliĐ ĐaŶopǇ͛, ďased oŶ ďut Ŷot ƌestƌiĐted to doŵiŶaŶt ideologǇ, that helps to 
reinforce the ͚ĐoŶseŶsual paƌadigŵ͛ foƌ soĐietǇ as a ǁhole ;EƌiĐsoŶ et al, ϭϵϴϳ: Ϯϳ-
43). News may be a competitive arena of conflicting viewpoints, but it is also 
culturally and structurally loaded. For all the fluidity and contingency observed in the 
process of produĐtioŶ, iŶ the fiŶal aŶalǇsis ͚the Ŷeǁs ŵedia aƌe as ŵuĐh aŶ ageŶĐǇ of 
policing as the law enforcement agencies whose activities and classifications are 
ƌepoƌted oŶ͛ ;EƌiĐsoŶ et al. 1991: 74). They reproduce order in the process of 
representing it.   
 
 
CRIME NEWS, SOCIAL DIVISION AND RISK  
 
The control model has been diversified to explore the ideological legitimation of 
inequalities not only in terms of class, but also gender, race and other social 
divisions.  
 
With the development of critical feminist research on crime reporting the control 
model underwent some conceptual reconfiguration. Here, dominant ideology is no 
less important, but it is framed primarily in terms of gender, and relates to the 
tendency of news reports to reinforce gender stereotypes that maintain unequal 
power relations in a patriarchal society (Cameron and Fraser 1987; Kitzinger and 
Skidmore 1995; Soothill and Walby 1991; Chancer 2003;). Given the cultural 
saturation of myths about gender, sex and rape, women in sex crime cases can be 
polaƌised iŶto ͚ǀiƌgiŶs͛ oƌ ͚ǁhoƌes͛ ďǇ eǀeŶ the ŵost ǁell ŵeaŶiŶg jouƌŶalists 
(Benedict 1992: 26). Reporting of everyday, non-celebrity violence against women, 
ǁheŶ deeŵed ŶeǁsǁoƌthǇ, is iŶfoƌŵed ďǇ ͚tƌaditioŶal ŶotioŶs of appƌopƌiate geŶdeƌ 
ƌoles͛ that iŶstitutioŶalise ǁoŵeŶ͛s iŶeƋualitǇ aŶd suďjugatioŶ ;MeǇeƌs ϭϵϵϳ: ϯͿ. IŶ 
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stark contrast, the demonic nature of criminal women can be amplified by, for 
example, the disproportionate use of visual images and sensational headlines, even 
when they are not the main protagonists in crime cases (Jones and Wardle 2008; 
Humphries 2009; Seal 2009, 2010).  
 
Research on the news construction of race, ethnicity and crime have evidenced 
similarly reductive reporting habits. The criminalisation in the news media of visible 
minorities has been evidenced in myriad studies (Barlow 1998; Chiricos and Eschholz 
2002; Law 2002; Cottle 2005; Dixon and Linz 2006; Stabile 2006; Gannon 2008;  
Brotherton and Barrios 2009), though few have looked in depth at production 
processes. Prevailing stereotypes regarding race and ethnicity make it more difficult 
for visible minority crime victims to secure media attention, public sympathy and 
legitimate victim status. Indeed, given the high levels of racialisation in the news, 
black and minoritǇ ethŶiĐ Đƌiŵe ǀiĐtiŵs ŵaǇ Ŷeed to ďe ͚deƌaĐialised͛ – that is, 
ƌepƌeseŶted iŶ a ǁaǇ that oďsĐuƌes ͚ƌaĐe͛ to the poiŶt of ǁƌitiŶg it ͚out of the sĐƌipt͛ 
– to ďeĐoŵe ͚legitiŵate͛ ǀiĐtiŵs ǁoƌthǇ of ǁidespƌead puďliĐ sǇŵpathǇ ;MĐLaughliŶ 
2005a). As with gendered crime reporting, the racialisation of crime news cannot 
adequately be understood through blanket accusations of institutionalised media 
prejudice (Greer 2007). It is more often, though no less problematically, the product 
of structurally and culturally embedded myths and newsroom practices that 
promote the marginalisation of certain values and interest and the promotion of 
others.  
 
Foƌ ͚ƌisk soĐietǇ͛ theoƌists, the tƌaŶsitioŶ fƌoŵ ŵodeƌŶitǇ to late-modernity has been 
characterised by a shift away from the focus on economic inequality and toward the 
Ŷatuƌe, patteƌŶiŶg aŶd ĐoŶtƌol of ͚ƌisk͛ ;BeĐk ϭϵϵϮͿ. IŶ this ĐoŶteǆt, the ĐoŶtƌol 
paƌadigŵ͛s foĐus oŶ the Đlass-based interests of a ruling elite and the media 
reproduction of dominant ideology loses purchase. Reiner, et al (2000, 2001) adopt a 
͚ƌisk soĐietǇ͛ fƌaŵeǁoƌk iŶ theiƌ ƌeseaƌĐh oŶ ŵedia ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶs of Đƌiŵe aŶd 
justice in the post-War era. They find that over time news reports of criminal 
offending include less acknowledgement of possible structural causation and more 
condemnation of what is presented as individual evil. Portrayals of criminal justice 
remain broadly supportive, but are increasingly complex and critical, focusing more, 
for example, on police ineffectiveness, systemic corruption, and conflict between 
official institutions. And, in the most significant change, crime victims shift from 
being incidental characters to becoming the central focus for highly emotionalised 
news stories built around their experiences of suffering (Reiner et al. 2000: 187). The 
risk society thesis provides a useful theoretical framework for exploring media 
representations of crime and justice, and the changing political and cultural 
sensibilities that shape the late modern condition.  
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THE PRODUCTION OF CRIME FICTION  
 
Although there have been many studies of the production of crime news, there has 
been little comparable research on fiction. All we have is memoirs of writers, 
directors, and other creators of crime fiction, and fan-oriented biographies or 
accounts of the making of particular films or programmes (see for example, Bennett 
2006; McLaughlin 2005b). The sole exception is an interview study of Hollywood 
writers, directors, and producers of television shows and cinema films (Lichter et al. 
1994: Part IV; Powers et al. 1996: ch. 3). This depicts them as former 1960s radicals 
oŶ a ͚loŶg ŵaƌĐh͛ thƌough the iŶstitutioŶs. Theiƌ ideologǇ ĐoŵďiŶes aĐĐeptaŶĐe of 
the economic and political institutions of America, to which they owe their status 
and privileges, with a libertarian stance on issues of personal and sexual morality 
that they have carried since their youth. They feel a mission to put as much of this 
into their work as is compatible with the overriding priority of keeping the audience 
ratings high and the networks happy. How this expressed ideology translates into 
actual creative and production practices has not been studied, however, in any body 
of research analogous to that on crime news. A recent ethnographic study of the 
long-running series The Bill does demonstrate the significance of shifting political-
economic pressures and the related cultural changes amongst productive personnel 
for developments in storylines and representations of policing (Colbran 2007, 2009a 
and b).  
 
 
OBSERVERS OR PLAYERS? THE MEDIA AND CRIME IN 
POSTMODERNITY 
 
In the introduction to this chapter two competing concerns about media 
ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶs of Đƌiŵe ǁeƌe outliŶed: the ͚ƌespeĐtaďle feaƌ͛ that theǇ ǁeƌe 
subversive and desubordinating; and the radical anxiety that they were a means of 
social control and discipline. The review of research suggests that there is a complex 
interplay between media representations of crime, criminal behaviour, and criminal 
justice.  
 
With variations according to medium and market, mass media news and 
entertainment are saturated with stories about crime. These disproportionately 
feature the most serious and violent crimes, but strip them from any analytic 
framework. The emphasis is on crime as the product of individual choice and free-
floating evil, diverting attention from any links to social structure or culture (Sasson 
1995; Reiner et al 2001; Greer 2007). There is strong evidence that media images can 
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influence criminal behaviour, but overall their direct effect is small relative to other 
factors. This is largely because people vary in their interpretation of representations 
according to demographic, generational, and other life-course factors. There is a 
variety of ways theoretically in which media representations could influence crime 
rates and patterns. For example, the overall volume of property crime is likely to be 
affected by media portrayals of material success as the acme of the good life in a 
context of structural inequalities of opportunity, as Mertonian strain theories 
suggest. It is unlikely to be an accident that the remorseless rise of volume property 
crime after the mid-1950s in Britain coincided with the advent of commercial 
television. Research on media effects has mainly assessed the consequences of 
representations of crime, using rather inadequate models and methods, not the 
theoretically more plausible criminogenic implications of other aspects of the media, 
for example the celebration of consumerism.  
 
The disciplinary role of media stories about crime, reproducing as well as 
representing order, is supported more clearly by the research. This is partly because 
media representations exaggerate the threat of crime and in the main promote 
policing and punishment as the antidote. Because of organizational exigencies as 
much as ideological reasons, the media present viewpoints on crime and criminal 
justice policy which—though not monolithic—are loaded towards official definitions. 
They tend to frame crime issues increasinglǇ iŶ a ͚laǁ aŶd oƌdeƌ͛ peƌspeĐtiǀe so 
other approaches become marginalized (Beckett 1997; Altheide 2002; Cavender 
2004; Reiner 2007). 
 
The present trends indicate a growing symbiosis between media images, criminality, 
aŶd ĐƌiŵiŶal justiĐe. IŶ “iŵoŶ Lee͛s ǁoƌds, ͚The ŵedia aƌe Ŷo loŶgeƌ, if theǇ eǀeƌ 
ǁeƌe, oďseƌǀeƌs of the sĐeŶe, theǇ aƌe plaǇeƌs iŶ the gaŵe͛ ;Đited iŶ PeaǇ ϭϵϵϴ: ϴͿ. 
This accentuates past patterns to an extent amounting to a qualitatively new stage. 
The insecure borderline between purportedly factual and fictional narratives is 
eroding. A growing variety of criminal justice lobbies and pressure groups seek to 
influence, if not construct, the news. At the same time technological developments 
iŶteƌaĐt ǁith Đultuƌal ĐhaŶges to pƌoduĐe ŵoƌe ͚ƌealitǇ͛ ďƌoadĐastiŶg ;FishŵaŶ aŶd 
Cavender 1998).  
 
The current stage of development reflects the impact of the more general features 
of ͚postŵodeƌŶitǇ͛ oŶ the ƌelatioŶship ďetǁeeŶ ŵedia, Đƌiŵe, aŶd ĐƌiŵiŶal justiĐe 
(Brown 2003). The space–time distanciation between criminal cases and their 
reporting in the media, and the reciprocal feedback of images on practice, are 
eƌodiŶg ƌapidlǇ ;GiddeŶs ϭϵϴϰ; ThoŵpsoŶ ϭϵϵϱͿ. ͚We liǀe iŶ a dƌaŵatised ǁoƌld͛ 
(Ericson 1991: 235), where the media are participants in the processes they 
represent. An ever-wider range of participants in the criminal justice process are not 
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oŶlǇ seekiŶg to iŶflueŶĐe ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶs ďut aƌe ĐƌeatiŶg ͚speĐtaĐles͛ speĐifiĐallǇ foƌ 
the media. Events such as the 1992 Los Angeles riots or the O. J. Simpson case, are 
broadcast around the world literally as they are happening. The tragedy of 11 
September 2001 is simply the most vivid and dramatic example of these 
developments to date, when thousands of people were murdered in front of the 
eyes of television audiences around the globe, in a way calculated to achieve the 
maximum possible media impact (Castells, 2004; Young 2007).  
 
The mass media are important not only because of their ideological significance. 
Media technology plays an increasingly direct role in social control, above all through 
the growth of CCTV and other forms of surveillance (Norris and Armstrong 1999; 
McCahill 2003; Jewkes 2010: ch. 7; Coleman 2005; Norris and McCahill 2006; Lyon 
2009; Lippert and Wilkinson 2010; Koskela 2011). Media technology can also be used 
to control the controllers, to make authorities more accountable, as the use of CCTV 
and other recording devices in police stations shows (Newburn and Hayman 2001).  
 
Criminal justice agencies thus seek to tailor their activities in a public relations-
friendly way that plays well in the news. Police investigate (sometimes instigate) all 
the crimes fit to print. Crimes and legal processes are not only reflected in reporting 
with greater rapidity, they may be created for news stories. Offences have been 
incited by law-enforcement agencies in order to have the successful investigation 
televised (as in the Azscam entrapment case analysed by Altheide 1993). Since the 
1960s, protesters and police act with self-ĐoŶsĐious aǁaƌeŶess that ͚the whole world 
is ǁatĐhiŶg͛ ;GitliŶ ϭϵϴϬͿ. IŶ the hi-tech, high surveillance context of contemporary 
public order events, accusations of police violence can no longer simply be denied 
away. The routine, real-time filming of policing activities by citizen and professional 
journalists is subjecting the institution to unprecedented levels of media and public 
scrutiny, and transforming how the police manage public order situations (Greer and 
McLaughlin, 2010; HMIC 2009).  
 
Mass media technologies make the model of contemporary social control a 
Synopticon (Mathiesen 1997): they provide the means for the many to see the few, 
offsetting the Benthamite paradigm of the few observing the many. However, this 
reciprocal process of surveillance between elites and masses remains highly 
unbalanced (Lyon 2003). The greater vulnerability of the powerful to exposure and 
scandal does not fundamentally change structures of power and advantage. Indeed 
Mathiesen argues plausibly that the illusion of intimacy with elites, provided by 
contemporary media surveillance of their activities, gives people a misleading sense 
of empowerment which acts as a more complex process of discipline than traditional 
foƌŵs of legitiŵatioŶ. It is possiďle, he aƌgues, ͚that the ĐoŶtƌol aŶd disĐipliŶe of the 
͞soul͟, that is, the ĐƌeatioŶ of huŵaŶ ďeiŶgs ǁho ĐoŶtƌol theŵselǀes thƌough self-
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control and thus fit neatly into a so-called democratic capitalist society, is a task 
ǁhiĐh is aĐtuallǇ fulfilled ďǇ a ŵodeƌŶ “ǇŶoptiĐoŶ͛ ;MathieseŶ ϭϵϵϳ: ϮϭϱͿ.  
 
The gƌoǁiŶg iŶteƌdepeŶdeŶĐe of ŵedia ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶ aŶd soĐial ͚ƌealitǇ͛ ƌaises the 
speĐtƌe of ͚a ŵedia spiƌal iŶ ǁhiĐh the ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶs of Đƌiŵe aŶd the feaƌ of Đƌiŵe 
pƌeĐiselǇ ĐoŶstitute . . . the hǇpeƌƌeal͛ ;OsďoƌŶe ϭϵϵϲ: ϯϲ; Feƌƌell et al, ϮϬϬϴͿ. 
Certainly these developments vastly complicate the vexed question of how images 
and narratives that are felt to be undesirable can be regulated or influenced. 
Perhaps hope lies precisely in the greater openness of the media to a diversity of 
inputs and influences. Past experience, however, suggests the more pessimistic 
pƌediĐtioŶ that although ĐoŶteŵpoƌaƌǇ ŵass ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs pƌeseŶt ͚aŶ 
appƌeĐiaďlǇ opeŶ teƌƌaiŶ foƌ stƌuggles foƌ justiĐe͛ ;EƌiĐsoŶ ϭϵϵϭ: ϮϰϮͿ, the diĐe aƌe 
loaded in favour of dominant interests—even if they have to struggle harder for their 
hegemony.  
  
SELECTED FURTHER READING 
Chris Greer (ed.) Crime and Media: A Reader London: Routledge, 2009) is an 
annotated collection of key contributions covering all the issues discussed in this 
Đhapteƌ.  ‘iĐhaƌd “paƌks͛s Television and the Drama of Crime (Buckingham: Open 
University Press, 1992) offers a theoretically sophisticated critique of content 
analyses of crime fiction, and their relationship to fear of crime. Illuminating 
studies of the production of crime news are the trilogy by R. Ericson, P. Baranek, 
and J. Chan, Visualising Deviance, Negotiating Control, and Representing Order 
(Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1987, 1989, 1991 respectively); P. 
“ĐhlesiŶgeƌ aŶd H. Tuŵďeƌ͛s Reporting Crime (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1994); C. Greer, Sex Crime and the Media (Cullompton, Devon: Willan, 2004) and 
͚Neǁs-MakiŶg CƌiŵiŶologǇ͛ in E.McLaughlin and T.Newburn (eds.) The Sage 
Handbook of Criminological Theory (London: Sage, 2010). Useful reviews of the 
ƌeseaƌĐh oŶ ŵedia effeĐts ĐaŶ ďe fouŶd iŶ: “. LiǀiŶgstoŶe, ͚OŶ the CoŶtiŶuiŶg 
Pƌoďleŵ of Media EffeĐts͛, iŶ J. CuƌƌaŶ aŶd M. Guƌeǀitch (eds), Mass Media and 
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Society (London: Arnold, 1996); D. Howitt, Crime, The Media and the Law (London: 
Wiley, 1998); and from a fundamentally critical perspective, M. Barker and J. 
Petley (eds), Ill Effects, 2nd edn, (London: Routledge, 2001). Excellent recent texts 
on crime and media are S. Brown, Crime and Law in Media Culture (Buckingham: 
Open University Press, 2003); E. Carrabine Crime, Culture, and the Media 
Cambridge: Polity;  Y. Jewkes, Media and Crime (London: Sage, 2nd. Ed. 2010). 
Useful edited volumes offering a rich diversity of research papers on media and 
crime are: R. Ericson (ed.), Crime and the Media (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1995); D. 
Kidd-Hewitt and R. Osborne (eds), Crime and the Media: The Post-Modern 
Spectacle (London: Pluto, 1996); P. Mason (ed.), Criminal Visions (Cullompton, 
Devon: Willan, 2003). The journal Crime, Media, Culture: An International Journal 
(London: Sage) is the key source for current articles. 
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